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NOTES
FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY OF INNOCENT
TRANSPORTING

OWNERS USED IN

LIQuoR-Forfeiture of property used as an instru-

mentality in violating the law has long been in the favor of enforcement officers as an effective means of curbing further violation. Federal Prohibition enforcement officers were quick to use forfeiture as
a weapon after the passage of the National Prohibition Act.' That
act, however, lacking the stringent provisions of usual forfeiture
acts, was lenient with the property of innocent owners. 2 Since forfeiture is relied on not so much to punish wrongdoers as to apply a
drastic remedy to law violation, those in charge of enforcing the laws
have desired to forfeit all property wrongfully used, without regard
to its ownership. Thus it is that the old revenue laws ' have been
invoked so frequently by federal officers seeking to force the forfeiture of vehicles of innocent owners used in transporting liquor.
There was considerable conflict in the various federal districts
after the passage of the National Prohibition Act as to whether it repealed the existing revenue laws under which vehicles carrying liquor
were subject to forfeiture. The question was settled by the Supplementary Act of i92i, 4 which stated that such laws were in force.
Subsequently it was held that a tax on prohibited goods was legal."
Thus the law now stands that vehicles seized in the unlawful transportation of liquor may be subject to forfeiture under revenue laws
which are not liberal with innocent owners, but which proceed against
their property in actions which, so it is claimed, are strictly in rem.6
These laws have been in force so long and have caused so much
litigation that there is no doubt that the property of an innocent
owner is forfeitable when it comes under their ban.7 But as in each
new case the innocent owner of forfeited property feels that injustice is being done, there have been frequent attempts to show that
under the particular facts of each case, the property should not be
forfeited. The subject has been discussed sufficiently,8 both before
S(1919) 41 Stat. 305.

2

U. S. v. Sylvester, 273 Fed. 253 (D. C., 1921) ; MCFADDEN, PROHIBITION,
72 U. oF P. L. REv. I81; Landers v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 780, io
S. E. 778 (1919).
'Rev. Stat 3o61, 3062; Rev. Stat 345o.
' (1921) 42 Stat. 222.
'U. S. v. Stafoff, 26o U. S. 477 (1923).
'U. S. v. One Buick Automobile, 3oo Fed. 584 (D. C., 1924); U. S. v.

§ 394;

Two Automobiles and Five Cases of Whisky, 2 Fed. (2d)' 264 (D. C., 1924).

"Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. U. S., 254 U. S. 505 (920); U. S. v. Mincey,
254 Fed. 287 (C. C. A., 1918); U. S. v. One Black Horse, 129 Fed. 167
(D. C., i9o6).

'See

72

U. OF PA. L. REv.

181; 34
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and after the National Prohibition Act became effective, so that it
seems enough here merely to point out two recent decisions which
present a novel attempt to protect the innocent owner.
In 192o the Supreme Court of the United States reserved opinion in a case whether property was forfeitable which had been "stolen
from the owner or otherwise taken from him without his privity or
consent." 9 Relying on this reservation, a Federal District Court held
that an automobile loaned by the owner to another, and by him to a
third person, was not forfeitable because of its illegal use in the hands
10 There was no doubt that the automobile would
of the third person.
if illegally used by the original borrower. A
forfeitable
have been
contrary decision was reached, and the earlier case criticized, in another District Court.'" There it was pointed out that the original
borrower was no more acting beyond his authority in relending the
automobile than he would have been in using it illegally himself. It
is merely removing the wrongful use one step farther from the
owner.' 2 It is admittedly a hardship on the innocent owner, and it
seems the more severe the farther the wrong is removed. It must
be considered, however, that there is no blame attributed to the
owner in any of these cases; the forfeiture is not a penalty against
him for lending his car. The justification is urged that the thing
itself is guilty, that the forfeit is an action in rem." But the only
reasonable basis for the decisions is that forfeiture aids the enforcement of the law; and for the purpose of drastic law enforcement, the
degree of innocence of the owner is of small consequence. Thus it
seems that the decision in favor of the owner makes a rather fine
14

distinction.

In cases of forfeiture the aphorism is often quoted that the law
does not favor forfeitures. The cases decided since the National
9

Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. U. S., supra, n. 7.

"U. S. v. One Reo Speed Wagon, 5 Fed. (2) 372 (D. C., 1925). In this
case the owner of a truck sent his son on an errand with it. The son loaned

innoit to one who violated the Customs Act of 1866, Rev. Stat. 3o62. The
cence of the owner was not clearly established, but the court presumes innocence.
"U. S. v. One Lincoln Touring Car, U. S. D. C. (N. D. N. Y.), September
to his daughter.
i4, 1925. The claimant of the car in this case had loaned itLaw.
Rev. Stat.
She allowed another to take it who violated the Customs
361, 3o62.

"U. S. v. One Saxon Automobile, 257 Fed. 251 (C. C. A., 19g9). There
to
is a dictum that the car would be forfeitable if the borrower had relent it by
the illegal user. The court says the owner has made the violation possible
putting the car into the wrongdoer's hands. Although this is not the reason
for forfeiture, when a car is stolen the owner should be protected because he
has not given up possession.
'Logan v. U. S., 26o Fed. 746 (C. C. A., gig); U. S. v. Rembert, 284
Fed. 996 (D. C., 1922).
"If in the usual case, where the first taker from the owner has illegally
used the car, the owner is admittedly wholly innocent, he can hardly urge the
point that he is more innocent in another case.
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Prohibition Act hardly bear out that assertion. If the Federal
Courts, as may be expected, are sympathetic with the endeavor to
enforce the Prohibition Act, it will probably be found that forfeiture of vehicles carrying liquor will readily be allowed, either under
the Prohibition Act or the Revenue Laws, as a quick and certain
blow at law violation.
W.F.C.
JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE WITH LEGISLATIVE DIsCRETION-Under our republican form of government the sovereign voice of the people resounds through three channels, the legislative, the judicial, and
the executive. The legislative speaks, the judicial interprets what it
says, while the executive obeys and re-echoes it. Our national government, as well as that of each state, is one of distribution of power.'
Each of the three governmental departments is distinct from the
other two, and has certain functions to perform which may not be
impinged upon by the others. This theory of checks and balances in
our government is too well established to be now impugned, 2 and has
even been recognized expressly by state constitutions.' In order to
lend a stability and durability to our governments, 4 the people have
declared constitutions, which have been created as expressive of their
paramount will. These constitutions are combinations of bills of
rights and declarations of distribution of power, and must be regarded as paramount to insure the integrity and permanence of our
political institutions. With these preliminary observations in mind
we are ready to study the interesting case of Lyons v. City of Bayonne," and its application to the foregoing principles.
The legislature of New Jersey passed a so-called Budget Act,
which provided that the governing bodies of municipalities might
appropriate public funds to meet emergencies arising within their
political boundaries when in their opinion such emergency had
arisen. The act also provided that the appropriation "if adopted by
a three-fourths vote, shall be conclusive as to the character and existence of an emergency within the meaning of this act." 6 A municipality made such an appropriation, declaring that an emergency had
arisen. A writ of certiorariwas granted by the state court to determine, upon a further hearing, whether such emergency had arisen.

'Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch 137 (U. S., 18o3).
'For an admirable treatment of the subject of governmental Checks and
Balances see MONTESQuiEU, THE SPIRT OF THE LAWS.
'See
Constitution of New Jersey, Art. 3; Constitution of Massachusetts,

Pt. I, § 30; Constitution of Missouri, Art. 3.
'People v. Draper, 15 N. Y. 532, 558 (1857).
aP3o At. I4 (N. J., 1925).
'P. L. 917, p. 56, § 25, as amended by P. L.

191, P. 377, § 3.
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This case is rendered doubly interesting when considered in
conjunction with the other New Jersey cases of McDonald v. Hudson County,7 and Willits v. Borough of Beach Haven.8 The latter
cases also considered the statute in question, and came to the conclusion that since the legislature had delegated its legislative right of
appropriation to a municipal governing body,' which it had a right
to do, 10 and had vested a discretion as to the exercise of that power
in such municipal body, when such body exercised its granted discretion and made an appropriation, the emergency which gave rise
to the appropriation could not be inquired into by the judiciary. The
constitutionality of the Budget Act was not questioned in any of the
three cases, the only point in issue being whether the court could review the decision of the municipality that an emergency had arisen.
Although the court in Lyons v. Bayonne seeks to explain Willits v. Beach Haven by declaring that the facts in the latter case were
regarded as constituting an emergency, while in the former they were
not to be necessarily so regarded, yet the principle laid down in Willits v. Beach Haven was that the exercise of the discretion under the
act as to the emergency was a legislative function, and as such, was
not reviewable by the judiciary. Thus on their principles, the cases
would seem to be contra.
In order to determine which is the better view, we must now
revert to the principles underlying the theory of our government.
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, with his characteristic accuracy of expression and finality of judgment, said: "The difference between the
departments undoubtedly is, that the legislature makes, the executive executes, and the judiciary construes the law; . . .
Under our theory of government, therefore, the power of the judiciary is not an initiative one, but rather a defensive one. It is defensive in that it seeks to protect the constitution, the paramount win
of the people, from being encroached upon by means not granted nor
authorized by it. This is the function of the judiciary and marks the
limitations of its powers. Thus it will be seen that the judicial power
is not superior to the legislative, since the latter power is the voice
of the people and the sovereign power, when confined within constitutional limits. It would seem that, practically, the judicial is superior in that it may override legislative acts, but it must be remembered that in so doing it is only guarding and effectuating the sovereignty of the people by declaring that their fundamental will as
expressed in their constitution is being violated by their legislative
122 At. 8ox (N. J., 1923).
'129 AtI. 737 (N. J., 1925).

'For a discussion of the limitations upon the power of the legislature to
delegate its legislative functions, and for citations of cases, see CooLEz, CoNSTiTUTIONAL LIisrTATIoNs, 163 et seq.
"Wilson v. McGuinness, 78 N. J. L. 346, 75 Atl. 455 (1909).
'Wayman v. Southard, io Wheat i, 46 (U. S., 1825).
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agents. In so doing, it does not make the law but merely interprets
it. Here again, its function is a defensive and not an initiative one.
Thus in its interpretation of the law, the judicial may review its
constitutionality. 12 But what may it do beyond this? Nothing, apparently, under our theory of government, as has already been pointeds
out, and this even though the act of the legislature be oppressive,"
impolitic, 14 or unjust.15
In Lyons v. Bayonne, it would seem that the power of the judiciary was limited to the determination of the constitutionality of the
Budget Act, and that after such has been passed upon, the power of
the judiciary merged into that of the executive to execute the law.
But the Budget Act was not declared unconstitutional. Then what
right did the court have to proceed further and declare that the judgment of the municipal body that an emergency had occurred, did not
concur with its own, and hence that such municipal judgment was
reviewable by it? It is submitted that it had no such right. The
It
municipal body was the duly delegated agent of the legislature3
exercised a power which had been constitutionally entrusted to it.
The legislature could have waited for such an emergency to arise, and
could have made the appropriation itself. But this might have proven
inconvenient and inexpedient, since the legislature might not have
then been in session, and it might have been difficult to call all its
members from the various parts of the state in time to properly meet
such emergency. In its wisdom it delegated to the municipal body
the power to appropriate, since this latter body could be called together for action more speedily than the legislature, its personnel
being within closer range. Lest the members of the municipal body
be timid in exercising their discretion, it was further provided that
their judgment should be final, thus vesting absolute legislative discretion in that body. That body, then, was the legislature for the
time being, and its act the act of the legislature. The decision of the
court, therefore, was a usurpation of legislative power. It was a
a
substitution of its own judgment for that of the legislature on
of
7
repeal
a
or
veto
a
practically
was
It
question.
legislative
purely
the legislative action, since the only proper way in which it could
artin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 3o4 (U. S., I816).
"There is some dicta to the effect that equity will relieve against private
legislative acts procured by fraud. But even this dicta is not prepared to go
so far in the case of general legislative acts. Tomkins v. Tomkins, ii N. J.
Eq. 512, 5,5 (1858).
"Greenville v. Seymour, 22 N. J. Eq. 458 (1871).
' See State v. Branin, 23 N. 3. L. 484, 494 (I852), where the court, in
passing upon an unjust but constitutional tax law, said: "Admitting that the
taxation be double, and therefore unequal and unjust, the power of the court
to interfere and declare it illegal, except in cases where it is also in violation
of some provision of the constitution, does not seem to be clear." So in State v.
City of Newark, 34 N. J. L. 236, 243 (187o).
"Wilson v. McGuinness, supra, note io.
' Shephard v. Wheeling, 30 W. Va. 479, 4 S. E. 635 (1887).
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have declared the appropriation void was by attacking its constitutionality, which it did not and apparently could not do. If it is to
be conceded that the court had a right to determine when an emergency arose, then why could not the court declare, in the absence of
any action on the part of the municipal body, that an emergency had
arisen, and issue a mandamus to each member of the municipal governing body commanding him to vote for the passage of an approThe court in Lyons v. Bayonne
priation to meet the emergency?
unquestionably is not prepared to go this far, but such action would
seem to be merely correlative to the action which they did take in declaring that the determination of whether an emergency had arisen
was for their own judgment. Thus they have substituted their own
judgment for that of the people's representatives in a purely legislative question.
Attacking the problem from another angle, the act of the agent
8
The act of the municipal body in makis the act of the principal.
ing the appropriation was, then, in the eyes of the law, an appropriation of the legislature itself. What if the legislature had not passed
the Budget Act, but had chosen to deal with municipal emergencies
when they arose. Let us suppose a situation similar to that in Lyons
v. Bayonne had arisen, and after a debate, the legislature passed an
appropriation to meet such situation, deciding that such was an emergency which merited consideration and aid. Is there anyone, even
the most ardent and enthusiastic proponent of extending judicial
power, who would maintain that, in the absence of unconstitutionality,
the judiciary would have the right to inquire into the wisdom and
necessity of the appropriation, with a view of declaring it nugatory,
should its judgment not concur with that of the people's representatives? Yet in Lyons v. Bayonne the court did that very thing. It is
true that the appropriation was not actually made by the legislature,
but it was made by its duly delegated agents, which in the intendment of law, was its own act.
But one further question need be considered. In addition to
reviewing the constitutionality of an act, the courts admittedly have
the power to construe and interpret the law, as was pointed out by
19
In our instant case, however, the
Mr. Chief Justice Marshall.
or interpretation. The meanconstruction
of
one
question was not
ing of "emergency" was not in issue, nor had it been ambiguously inserted in the Budget Act. The definition and usage of the term was
understood by all parties. The question simply was whether the
facts giving rise to the alleged emergency satisfied the accepted definition of "emergency," and such was a question of judgment and not
of construction, and one which was solely for the legislature, which
in turn had exclusively reposed it in one of its agents.
"The legislature, however, may exercise a control over such municipal
bodies and review their acts by subsequent legislation. Rawson v. Spencer, ir3
Mass. 40 (1873).
' See note Ii, supra.
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In conclusion, then, it would seem that the judiciary may interfere with legislative acts only when such acts exceed the powdr
20
granted to the legislature by the constitution, and in those cases
an interpretation.
and
require
not
clear
acts
are
legislative
where the
although in the latter case there is really no interference with such
legislative acts, but rather an expression as to what they say and mean.
In the case of Lyons v. City of Bayonne, et al., we have neither a
problem of constitutionality nor a question of construction. It seems,
therefore, that since the two grounds upon which the judiciary may
interpose itself into the legislative were absent in the instant case,
that the action of the court was an impingement by the judicial wing
of the government upon the legislative unwarranted either by the
state constitution or our republican theory of government, and that
the proper rule is that pronounced in Willits v. Beach Haven.
J. S. C., Jr.
INHERITANGE TAXEs ON TRUST ESTATES-Two recent decisions in federal courts, in connection with what is known as the Estate Tax Law of I918,1 serve to illustrate the variance in opinion
upon the meaning of a phrase which has been the object of contention
in numerous cases.
Nearly all the state "inheritance tax" laws, so called, tax the
transfer of any interest in property, real or personal, in respect of
which the decedent has made a transfer, or created a trust, intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after his death. This
is a feature of the Estate Tax Act of 1924,2 which was carried over
from the Estate Tax Act of i9i8.' The federal cases, mentioned
above, arose under this provision of the latter act.
In the case of Girard Trust Company v. McCaughn,4 land was
conveyed by A to B, in trust for A for life, remainder to C. A died.
It was held that this transfer was not taxable because it did not take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the death of A. The
basis of the judgment was that the conveyance, being absolute and
taking effect at once, gave C a vested interest of which he had both
possession and enjoyment, not postponed until the death of A,5 regardless of the fact that A received a benefit from the property while
she lived.
In Reed v. Howbert,6 A conveyed certain personal property to
B, in trust, the income to be paid to A for life, then the income, and

"Wellington, Petitioner, 16 Pick. 87, 96 (Mass., 1834).

'(919) 40 Stat. io97.
243 Stat. 304.

'Supra, note I, § 402 (C).
'3 Fed. (2d) 618 (1925).

'Ibid., p. 61g.
'U. S. D. C., Colo., October 3,

1925.
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ultimately the principal, to C. A died. The transfer was held to be
taxable as taking effect in possession and enjoyment after the death
of A. It was granted that A made an irrevocable transfer of the
legal title to the trustee and that to that extent it had ceased to be his
property. But he retained that which gave value to the property, the
beneficial interest. 7 C never had legal title, said the court, and not
until A's death did he get any benefits.
Although one case deals with real property and the other with
Inasmuch
personalty, the act applies as well to one as to the other
as the practical effects of the conveyance in each case are identical,
the cases are clearly opposed. The question is, does the interest of
C take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after A's death, a valid
trust having been created during his lifetime.
In both cases it is granted that the legal title passed absolutely
to the trustee when the trust was created. In Girard Trust Company
v. McCaughn it was held that C, at the same time, received a vested
interest. But, in Reed v. Howbert it is also true that C received a
vested interest." It follows that each had possession and enjoyment
of a remainder interest when the trust was created by the grantor,
and the decision in Girard Trust Company v. McCaughn appears
technically correct.
The reasons for the conflict, then, must lie in the different constructions placed upon the words "possession or enjoyment." The
state decisions throw little light upon the proper interpretation of
these words. On similar facts, the same result is reached as in Reed
0
And where A, in addition to a life interest or other
v. Howbert.1
benefit, reserves a power of revocation, it is generally held that the
possession or enjoyment of C takes effect after A's death."' But
the reservation of a power of revocation alone does not affect the
possession or enjoyment of the cestui que trust nor prevent the formation of a valid trust.' 2 So it appears that the beneficial interest of
A for life is the real ratio decidendi. But in cases where the courts
find no attempt to defraud, or to evade taxation, by the creation of
The court quotes language in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U. S. 429, 589, 590, 591 (1894).
'Supra, note i, § 402.
'Blodgett v. Trust Co., 97 Conn. 405, 116 At. 9o8 (1922).
" In re Schuh, 66 Mont. 50, 212 Pac. 516 (1922); Douglas County v.
Kountze, 84 Neb. 5o6, 121 N. W. 593 (igog); Seibert's Appeal, iio Pa. 329,
i At. 346 (1888); DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa. 386, 15 Atl. 641 (1889).
" Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U. S. 625 (195) ; Matter of Bostwick, 16o N.
Y. 489, 55 N. E. 208 (1899) ; Matter of Schmidlapp, 236 N. Y. 278, 14o N. E.
697 (1923) ; Lines's Estate, 155 Pa. 378, 26 Atl. 728 (1893). In re Fulhan's
Estate, 96 Vt. 3o8, 119 AtI. 433 (1922).
"Jones v. Clifton, 101 U. S. 225 (1879) ; State v. Trust Co., 289"Ill. 475,
124 N. E. 662 (1gg) ; Stone v. Hackett, 78 Mass. 227 (858) ; In re Masury's
Estate, 51 N. Y. Supp. 331, 28 App. Div. 58o, affirmed in 159 N. Y. 532, 53 N.
E. 1127 (1899) ; Dolan's Estate, 279 Pa. 582, 124 Atl. 176 (1924).
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the trust, they adhere to the technical construction as in Girard Trust
13
This seems to indicate that the majority
Company v. McCaughn.
of the courts, in such tax cases, are moved by considerations of public policy rather than by strict legal reasoning. The
14 language in
some of the cases seems to substantiate this conclusion.
The early inheritance taxes applied only to transfers of property by will or by inheritance. Their extension has been the result
of efforts on the part of the legislatures to stop the loop-holes by
which the tax could be evaded. It is extremely likely that, in the provision of the tax statutes under discussion, the lawmakers intended
to tax the type of conveyance represented in Girard Trust Company
v. McCaughn and Reed v. Howbert.
It would appear that the words used do not cover such cases,
and that the courts are indulging in judicial legislation to hold otherwise. "Possession or enjoyment" is exceedingly indefinite phraseology, and capable of various interpretations. It should not be left to
the courts to probe the intention of the legislature in tax cases, especially where the' result is in most cases adverse to the taxpayer, as
we have seen. The policy of the courts may be sound, but the meaning of the statutes should be expressed in such unequivocal language
that the same application can be made to all cases.
P.L.I.
MAY THE PUBLIC RELY ON SAFEGUARDS ESTABLISHED BY
RAILROADS AT GRADE-CRosSINGS?-As a general rule, the duty of a
railroad company with reference to the conduct of flagmen ' and the
operation of safety gates 2 at a crossing is the same whether these
safeguards are required by law or are maintained voluntarily for a
sufficient length of time for the public to become accustomed to their
existence. As stated in Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Wright,' "It is law
that where it assumes the duty, it is immaterial whether or not the
duty to maintain a flagman has been imposed by law upon a railroad.
If it assumes the duty, it is bound to perform it with due care . ..
By placing and keeping a flagman at the crossing of its own volition, appellant recognized that the crossing was a dangerous one, and
'Stone v. Hackett, 78 Mass. 227 (1858) ; Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 21
Atl. 149 (18gi) ; Windolph v. Girard Trust Co., 245 Pa. 349, 91 Ati. 634 (1914).
'Vanderbilt v. Eidman, 196 U. S.480, 492 (19o4). Cf. Matter of Hoffman, 143 N. Y. 327, 38 N. E. 311 (1894).
'Dolph v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry., 74 Conn. 538, 51 Ati. 525 (1902);
Chicago & Alton R. Co. v. Wright, 120 Ill. App. 218 (19o5) ; State v. Boston
& Maine R. R., So Me. 43o, 15 AtI. 36 (1888) ; Wolcott v. N. Y. & L. B. Ry.,
68 N. J. L. 421, 53 Atl. 297 (1902) ; Passarello v. West Jersey & S. R. R., 98
N. J. L. 790, 121 Ati. 708 (1923).
'State v. Boston & Maine R. R., 8o Me. 430, 15 Ati. 36 (1888); Edgerley
v. Long Island R. R., 46 App. Div. 284, 61 N. Y. Supp. 677 (1899).
3 120 Ill.
App. 218 (i9o5).
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that the ordinary precaution required by statutes were inadequate and
insufficient to protect the public."
In several recently decided cases, the liability of the railroad for
its failure to properly discharge this assumed duty has been at issue,
and the decisions are mainly in accord. In a Minnesota case,4 it
was held that the absence of a flagman at a crossing, where usually
one was stationed, did not relieve the plaintiff from the exercise of
care, but within reasonable limits the plaintiff might rely upon the
fact that the flagman was not about as some assurance of safety.
Maryland " has held that the absence of the usual watchman at a
country crossing did not warrant an inference that it was safe to
cross. Two southern jurisdictions have also indicated their attitude
upon this point. A Louisiana case' has held that open gates at a
crossing on a city street do not constitute an invitation to cross nor a
guaranty that the crossing is safe, and that one using such a crossing is negligent in not stopping, looking and listening, notwithstanding the fact that the gates have not been closed, while Alabama 7 has
declared that a traveler, while he may rely upon the watchman if he
is at his post, must take reasonable precautions before crossing if the
watchman is absent or inattentive.
The extent to which one may interpret the absence of a flagman
or the failure to lower safety gates as an assurance that it is safe to
cross has been decided frequently by the courts. The many situations and different circumstances affecting this question, however,
have not resulted in establishing a complete unanimity of opinion.
Rather, the cases seem to divide themselves into three groups.
The first group of cases comprises those which are frequently
cited 8 and referred to as establishing the proposition that the traveler may rely wholly upon the absence of the flagman or the open
gate.0 Such vague and general expressions as "invitation to cross"
and "assurance of safety" have been repeatedly used by the courts in
their decisions with the result that an impression has been created
that the mutual obligation to use care in approaching a crossing has
been shifted entirely to the shoulders of one of the parties by reason
"Buelow v. C., R. I. & P. P. R., 204 N. W. 57I (Minn., 1925).
P. R. R. v. Yingling, 129 Atl. 36 (Md., 1925). In this case the company
maintained a watchman at the crossing, but a short time before the accident bad
shortened his hours. It was held that the plaintiff could not interpret the absence of the flagman as an assurance of safety, even though he had no notice
of the fact that the watchman's hours had been changed.
'Gibbens v. N. 0. T. Co., 15 So. 367 (La., 1925).
'Louisville & N. K_ Co. v. Cunningham Hdw. Co., 104 So. 433 (Ala., J925).
'Union P. K. Co. v. Rosewater, 157 Fed. i68, 172 (C.C. A., 1907) ; see
Borders v. Boston & Me. K.R., 15 Me. 2o7, 212, 98 Atl. 662, 665 (1916).
9
Northeastern R. Co. v. Wanless, 3o L. T. R. (N. S.) 275 (Eng., 1874);
Chicago, K. I. & P. R. K_ v. Clough, 134 Ill.
586, 25 N. E. 664 (I89O) ; Louisville & N. K_ R. v. Wilson, 124 Ky. 836, 100 S. W. 302 (907); Montgomery
v. Mo. Pac. Ry., i81 Mo. 477, 79 S.W. 930 (1904) ; Wilson v. N. Y., N. H.
& H. K.K, 18 K-I. 491, 29 At. 258 (894).
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gates. An instance is found
of its maintenance of flagmen or safety
10
it was said, "If the preswhere
R.,
R.
in State v. Boston & Maine
ence of a flagman and closed gates indicate a passing train, certainly
the absence of the flagman and open gates must be evidence that the
train is not presently due and expected." Again, in Penna. R. R. v.
Stegemneier," the statement was made that an open gate "is in the nature of an invitation to cross and a declaration that there are no approaching trains."
The cases in the second group go to the other extreme, and hold
that one has no right to rely upon the absence of the flagman or the
fact that the gates have not been lowered, even though he has been
at the crossing by these signs
accustomed to regulating his conduct
12
The attitude of these courts is
for a considerable period of time.
13
best illustrated by a Pennsylvania case, in which it was held that
one has no right to omit the ordinary precautions, namely, to stop,
look and listen, merely because he finds that the safety gates have
not been lowered. The language of Chief justice Paxson is signifi4
cant. "The rule 1 itself is so valuable; is sustained by such abundant
authority, and is moreover founded upon such excellent commonsense reasons that we will neither depart from it, nor allow it to be
undermined by exceptions. It is a clear and certain rule of duty
and a departure from it is more than evidence of negligence, it is negposiligence per se." Pennsylvania is undoubtedly committed to this
5
tion, as is evidenced by the approval of Greenwood v. R. R.,' in several recent cases.""
Included in the third group are those cases which concede that
the traveler is not entitled to rely absolutely upon the open gate or the
absence of the flagman, but hold that he may rely upon these safeextent depending upon the circumguards to a certain extent, that
7
In other words, the courts in these
stances of the particular case.'
" 80 Me. 43o, 444, 15 AtI. 36 (1888).
118 Ind. 305, 310, 20 N. E. 843, 845 (1888).
Tifin v. St. L., I. M. & S. Ry., 78 Ark. 55, 93 S. W. 564 (i9o6); Smith
v. Wabash R. R., 141 Ind. 92, 4o N. E. 27o (1894) ; White v. Chicago & N. W.
Ry., 102 Wis. 489, 78 N. W. 585 (1899).
Greenwood v. Phil. W. & B. R. R., 124 Pa. 572, 17 Atl. 188 (1889).
"Requiring one to stop, look and listen.
"Supra, note 13.
"Earle v. P. & R. R. R., 248 Pa. 193, 93 Ad. iooi (1915); Serfas v.
Lehigh & N. E. R. R., 270 Pa. 306, 309, 113 AtI. 370, 371 (192i); Zotter v.
Lehigh Valley R. R., 28o Pa. 14, 24, 124 AUt. 284, 287 (1924).
'Blount v. Grand Trunk Ry., 61 Fed. 375 (C. C. A., 1894); St. Louis,
Van. & T. H. R. R. v. Dunn, 78 Ill. 197 (1875); Koch v. So. Cal. Ry., 148
Cal. 677, 84 Pac. 176 (1906) ; Pittsburgh, Cinc. & St. L. R. v. Yundt, 78 Ind.
373 (i88I); Indianapolis U. R. Co. v. Neubacher, 16 Ind. App. 21, 43 N. E.
576 (1896); Sights v. Louisville & N. R. R., 117 Ky. 436, 78 S. W. 172
(19o4) ; Merrigan v. Boston & A. R. R., 154 Mass. 189, 28 N. E. 149 ((1891) ;
Palmer v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 112 N. Y. 234, i9 N. E. 678 (1889);
Kane v. N. Y., N. H. & H. . R., 132 N. Y. 16o, 3o N. E.256 (1892); Hodgin
v. So. Ry., 143 N. C. 93, 55 S.E. 413 (I906).
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cases still require that the traveler use reasonable care in approaching
the crossing, though the quantum of care which will be reasonable is
less where gates are maintained or a flagman provided than it would
be had these safeguards not been furnished. What constitutes reasonable care under the circumstances is of course a question of fact
for the jury.I s

This is the view taken by the court in Buelow v. C., R. I. & P.
R.,'9 and it is supported by both reason and authority. 20 It may be
seen from the cases that the number of different situations in which
the question might arise is almost infinite, and it follows that a rule
to be applicable to each situation must be flexible. It is apparent
that an adoption of the rule as expressed in the first group of cases
would be equivalent to constituting the railroad company an insurer
of the traveler's safety, while it is evident that the rule as propounded
by the Pennsylvania court, particularly in cities, is not practicable. A
rule, therefore, which does not relieve a traveler from the duty of
looking and listening upon approaching a railroad crossing, but permits him to take into consideration the absence of a flagman or an
open gate as to the extent to which he should look, appears to be the
proper one. New York has adopted this rule, holding in Elias v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 2 1 where, though not required to do so by law, the
company had stationed a flagman at a crossing, that that fact, as to
one who knows it and comes to rely upon it, may be considered by a
jury in deciding whether under all the circumstances he has used reasonable care for his own protection, and that the absence of the flagman might well affect the vigilance which the jury would otherwise
require. A similar attitude is shown by the Massachusetts court in
Merrigan v. Boston & Albany R. R. 22 in which case it was held that
the existence of gates, intended to be closed when trains pass, did
not excuse the plaintiff from looking before crossing, but that he
had a right to take the fact into consideration in determining to what
extent he would look. Illinois 2 and Minnesota 24 are also included
among the jurisdictions in which this rule is recognized.
In the face of these decisions it cannot be contended that a traveler is entitled to rely wholly upon the open gate or the absence of
a flagman as a guarantee that it is safe to cross. It is doubtful
" Delaware & H. Co. v. Larnard, 161 Fed. 520 (C. C. A., 1908); Chicago,
St. L. & P. R. R. v. Hutchinson, I2O Ill. 587, I N. E. 855 (1887); Richmond
v. Chicago & W. M. Ry., 87 Mich. 374, 49 N. W. 621 (i8gi) ; Woehrle v.
Minn. Tr. Ry., 82 Minn. I65, 84 N. W. 791 (9o).
"Supra, note 4.
"Cases cited in note 17, supra.
"226 N. Y. I54, 123 N. E. 73 (igig).
'54 Mass. i89, 28 N. E. I49 (i8gi).
Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Blaul, I75 Ill. 183, 5i N. E. 895 (T898).
'Haugen v. N. P. Ry., 132 Minn. 54, I55 N. W. io58 (i916).
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whether the cases relied upon 25 as establishing that proposition were
really intended to go that far, and whether it is not a misconception
due to the vague and general language used. Certainly the modern
cases deny the proposition and tend rather to establish the saner view
that one may rely to a certain extent upon the safeguards maintained,
the question of whether the reliance was justified in each particular case being left to the jury. The courts deciding these cases do
not consider it necessary to require the extreme care called for by
the Pennsylvania courts in their decisions, which may soon occupy a
unique position in the law.
I. C. N.
TAX ON TRUST INCOME IN THE HANDS OF THE BENEFICIARY-

The case of Irwin v. Gavitl,recently decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States, presented the question of whether a share of the
income of a trust estate, received periodically over an indeterminate
period, should be included in the taxable income of the beneficiary
under the Income Tax Act of 1913.2 The effect of the decision,
however, is not limited to cases arising under that Act. While the
Acts of 1916 3 and 1917 4 levied a tax upon the income of the estates and trusts to be paid by the fiduciary, the Acts of 1918 r and
1921 6 provided that the distributive share of each beneficiary,
whether distributed or not, should be included in his net income. The
Act of 1924 7 also provides that the estate or trust shall be allowed
as a deduction in computing its income the amount of income which
is to be distributed currently by the fiduciary to the beneficiaries, but
the amount so allowed as a deduction shall be included in computing the net income of the beneficiaries, whether distributed to them
or not. Whether or not these distributive shares are properly included as taxable income of the beneficiary depends upon the same
principles which apply in the case of Irwin v. Gavit.
The facts of the case can be briefly stated. The will of Anthony
N. Brady directed that the residue of his estate should be divided into
six parts, and left one part in trust, to pay so much of the net income as the trustees in the exercise of their absolute discretion should
deem proper for the maintenance and support of the testator's granddaughter. The balance of the net income was to be divided into two
5

Supra, notes 8 and 9.
U. S. 16I (1925).
238 Stat 114, 166, c. 16.
339 Stat. 756, c. 463, §2 (b) (3) and (4).
4 40 Stat 3o, c. 63. This Act left in force those sections of the Act of
1916, including the sections referred to above, which were not specifically
repealed.
:268

54o Stat. 1057, c. 18, § 219 (a) (4) and (d).
'42 Stat 227, C. 136, §219 (a) (4) and (d).
43 Stat. 250, c. 234, § 219 (a) (2) and (b) (2).
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equal parts, and one part paid to the plaintiff in quarter-yearly installments during his life. The plaintiff's right to the income was limited,
however, by a gift over when the granddaughter reached the age of
twenty-one, or upon her death at an earlier age. Since the granddaughter was six years old when the will was probated, the plaintiff's interest could not exceed fifteen years. This action was brought
against the Collector to recover taxes upon sums received from the

trustees during the years of 1913, 1914 and 1915, and penalties, which
the plaintiff had paid under protest. The District Court overruled
the Collector's demurrer," and gave judgment for the plaintiff upon
the ground that these sums were gifts, and not taxable under the
9
Act. This judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
and was taken to the Supreme Court upon a writ of certiorari. That
court reversed the judgment, holding that the sums were taxable income and not gifts.
0
It had been decided 1 that the Act of 1913 did not impose a
tax upon the income of trust estates which was held for an unknown
or unascertained beneficiary. In Irwin v. Gavit it was urged that the
Act imposed no tax upon the income of the trust which was distributed to the beneficiary. The plaintiff relied upon two arguments.
First, the payments were gifts, and exempt under the Act. Second,
if the income was taxable it should have been taxed in the hands of
the trustee, and not in the hands of the beneficiary.
Section II A, Subdivision i, of the Income Tax Act of 1913 provided that a tax should be levied "upon the entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding calendar year to
citizens of the United States." Section II B (i) provided that the
net income of a taxable person should include "gains, profits and income derived from any source whatever including the income from
but not the value of property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent." By section II D (3) trustees were to make returns of the
net income of the person for whom they acted. By section II E (3)
trustees who were required to file returns were authorized to withhold enough to pay the normal tax.
The decisions of the District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals in this case went upon the ground that these sums were
bequests, and exempt under section II B of the act.
The majority of the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes,
came to the conclusion that the language of the statute left no doubt
that Congress did not intend to exempt these sums as gifts. Section
II A, Subdivision I, purported to levy a tax upon all income, and the
sums paid to the plaintiff by the trustees were undoubtedly income.
The provisions of sections II D (3) and E (3) showed that Congress
did not intend to exempt the income of estates and trusts.
Fed. 643 (D. C., i92I).
'295 Fed. 84 (C. C. A., 1923).
1
" Smietanka v. First Trust & Savings Bank, 257 U. S. 6o2
81275

(1922).
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The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Sutherland, in which Mr.
Justice Butler concurred, insisted upon a literal interpretation of a
taxing statute,"- and cited authority to show that the income was a
gift. In the case cited,' it had been contended that the income was interest on a legacy, and within the rule that such interest did not begin
to run until the expiration of one year after the death of the testator. The court held that this rule applied only in the case of a general legacy out of the corpus of the estate, and that the income in this
case was the legacy itself. On the other hand, in the case of the
United States v. Fidelity Trust Company," it was held that a legacy
of the net income of a trust for life was an estate vested in possession and enjoyment upon the death of the testator. Upon this view,
there was in the case of Irwin v. Gavit, a gift of a beneficial interest
in the trust fund, and the sums received were income from this interest.'4 This answer to the contention of the dissenting judges is
suggested in the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes, although he says
that he does not regard it as controlling.
It is submitted that the statute must be taken as a whole, and
that the majority of the court was justified in finding that Congress
did not intend to include the income of estates and trusts in the term
"gift" or "bequest" in Section II B (i) of the Act of 1913. In the
Acts of 1918, 1921 and 1924, this intention is more clearly expressed.
Section 213 (b) (3) in all three acts is substantially the same as that
part of section II B (i) of the Act of 1913 applying to gifts. But
in a later section of these acts it is specifically provided that the distributive share of each beneficiary in the income of a trust estate shall
be included in his net income.' 5
Having come to the conclusion that the sums received by the
plaintiff were not exempt as gifts, the court holds that they are taxable in the hands of the beneficiary. It had been argued that, while the
stuns might be income of the trust estate, they were not income in
U. S. v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 187-188 (1924).
'Matter of Stanfield, '35 N. Y. 292, 31 N. E. 1013 (1892). For a presentation of this view of the case, see 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 413.
"222 U. S. 158 (1911).
The case arose under the War Revenue Act of
1898, 30 Stat 464, c. 448, which levied a succession tax. The Act of June 27,
19o2, 32 Stat. 4o6, c. xii6, repealed the Act of 1898, and provided for a
refund of all taxes upon legacies which had not become vested in possession
and enjoyment before June I, 19o2. Suit was brought for the recovery of the
difference between an amount of tax based upon the value of the beneficiary's
interest, calculated with the aid of mortuary tables, and an amount of tax
based upon the two payments of income actually received by the beneficiary
'See

before June I,

19o2.

The court denied recovery.

" It has been suggested that the sums should not be regarded as income
until the beneficiary has received an amount equal to the present value of his
interest at the time it become vested in him. MONTGOMERY, INcOME TAX
PROCEDURE, 1925 ed., 1403.

"In the case of Baltzell v. Casey, 3 Fed. (2d) 428 (1925) it was apparently
assumed that the income was subject to tax in the hands of the beneficiary.
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the hands of the beneficiary. One answer to this is found in the
view stated above that the will gave the plaintiff a beneficial interest in the estate. The answer given by the court was that the income was taxable in the hands of the trustee, and retained its character after it was paid over to the beneficiary. There would seem to
be no reason why the tax should not be paid by the recipient.
. Aside from purely legal arguments, the practical result of the
decision in Irwin v. Gavit would seem to be reasonable. Where the
separate income of the beneficiary is less than the income of the trust
estate, the rule in Irwin v. Gavit will work to the advantage of the
taxpayer. Conversely, where the income of the trust fund is less
than the separate income of the beneficiary, the government will benefit. Taxpayers whose cases fall under the second class will undoubtedly regard the rule as a harsh one. But it should be remembered
that, apart from technicalities, there is no substantial difference between the case where a man receives the legal title to property with
the right to the income during his life, but with no right to dispose of
the corpus, and the case where the legal title is given to a trustee, with
the same provision as to the income. In both cases his actual interest is the same. Under the rule adopted by the lower court in Irwin
v. Gavit the income would be subject to tax in the first case, but not
in the second. Under the decision of the Supreme Court, it would be
taxed equally in both cases. It would seem, therefore, that the decision is correct.
L.B.C.
DUTY OF PASSENGER IN TAXICAB TO CAUTION DRwzFR-It is
well recognized that a common carrier owes the duty of exercising
the highest degree of care for the safety of its passengers.' It is an
equally well-established principle of law, that no person is ever absolved from exercising reasonable and ordinary care for his own
safety. It is on the latter principle that we find innumerable 2 instances of the defense of contributory negligence3 of the plaintiff.
The case of Garrow v. Seattle Taxicab Co. presents an unusual
situation wherein the two principles set forth above are brought into
conflict. The plaintiff was a paying passenger in the taxicab of the
defendant, which, due to negligent driving, was wrecked by colliding
with a tree blown down and lying in the street. At the time of the
accident, a storm was raging, the wind reaching a velocity of eighty
miles an hour, trees were blown over, telephone wires were down,
and driving required extreme care. The testimony of the plaintiff
showed that he realized these conditions and that the cab was being
driven recklessly, but that he took no steps to caution or request the
1
Boland v. Gay, 201 II1. App. 359 (1916); Carlton v. Boudar, 118 Va.
521, 88 S. E. 174 (1916).

2See THoimPSoN, NEGLIGENCF, § 172.

'Supreme

Court of Washington, August 24, 1925.
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driver to go more carefully. The defendant pleaded contributory
negligence.
The trial court instructed the jury that if they found that the
plaintiff noticed or should have noticed the defendant's recklessness,
and if they believed that an ordinary and prudent man would have
warned, cautioned, or directed the driver to drive in a more careful
manner, and if they found that the plaintiff failed to do so and his
failure caused or contributed to causing the accident, then the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and the verdict must be
for the defendant. On appeal, this charge was approved.
The question which immediately presents itself is just what duty
is imposed on a passenger in a taxicab, or other common carrier negligently run, before he, the plaintiff, can predicate a right of recovery
on the defendant's negligence.'

In reaching the conclusion that the passenger has the duty of
cautioning the driver under certain circumstances, the court in Garrow v. Seattle Taxicab Co., having no direct authority upon which to
rely, drew upon a line of cases in which the facts are analogous to
those of the case at issue, but with this very important difference,
that the plaintiff was an invited guest suing a third party whose vehicle had collided with that in which the guest was riding; or an in6
vited guest suing his driver, or a paying passenger suing a third
party. 7 In all three of these situations, the courts are fairly unanimous in holding that failure to caution or protest, where the dangers

are patent and recognized by the plaintiff, is contributory negligence."
As is stated in Hardie v. Barrett," "the rule is well established that
when possible dangers, arising out of the negligent operation of a

4
Terminal Taxicab Co. v. District of Columbia, 241 U. S. 252 (1916);
Primrose v. Casualty Co., 232 Pa. 21o, 81 Ati. 2iA (1gr1).
Pyle v. Clark, 75 Fed. 644 (1896); Durchester v. Wright, 138 Md. 577,

114 AUt. 574 (192i); United Ry. v. Crain, 123 Md. 332, 91 AUt. 405 (1914);
White v. Portland Gas Co., 84 Ore. 643, 165 Pac. i005 (917); Hardie v.
Barrett, 257 Pa. 42, 1o AUt. 75 (1917), and cases cited therein; Knoxville
Ry. v. Vangilder, 132 Tenn. 487, 178 S. W. 1117 (9,5) ; Atwood v. Utah Co.,
44 Utah 366, 14o Pac. 37 (914); Lawrence v. Denver R. R., 52 Utah 414,
174 Pac. 8,7 (1918).
'Powell v. Berry, 145 Ga. 696, 89 S. E. 753 (1916) ; Masten v. Cousins,
App. 268 (i919) ; Sharp v. Sprout, iii Kan. 735, 2o8 Pac. 613 (1922) ;
216 Ill.
Lavine v. Abramson, 142 Md. 222, 12o At. 523 (923); State v. Phillinger,
142 Md. 365, i2o At. 878 (1923).
Thompson v. Los Angeles Ry., 165 Cal. 748, 134 Pac. 709 (1913) ; East

Tenn. Ry. v. Markens, 88 Ga. 6o, 13 S. E. 855 (1891) ; Cotton v. Willmar &
Sioux Falls Ry., 99 Minn. 366, iog N. W. 835 (i9o6); Rush v. Metropolitan
Ry., 157 Mo. App. 504, 137 S. W. 1029 (911).

'But it is the prevailing view that an invited guest has no control over
the car. Lawrence v. Denver R. R. Co., supra, note 5; Powell v. Berry,
supra, note 6. And so also as to paying passengers. Harmon v. Barbour, 247
Fed. 1 (1g18); Cotton v. Willmar & Sioux Falls Ry., supra, note 7; Van
Hoeffen v. Columbia Taxicab Co., I79 Mo. App. 591, 162 S. W. 694 (913).
I Supra, note 5, P. 46, ioi AtL 76.
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Thus far, the principal case appears to be correct. But there are
many objections. The first one is that such a view -gives practically
no effect to the principle that a common carrier owes a particularly
high degree of care to its passengers. The carrier is well paid for its
services and should hire competent servants, so that a passenger when
entering a cab should, feel at perfect liberty to leave the management
of the vehicle to the operator who is being held out as competent in
that line of work. Of what effect will the principle of high degree of
care be, if a passenger is obliged to continually worry himself by
looking out for the possible negligence of the carrier's employees in
the control of the vehicle?
The next difficulty is, at what point the plaintiff's failure to caution will constitute negligence. The court itself in the principal case
in explaining the law, clearly presents this problem. It says, "a passenger is under no duty, save in exceptional cases, to be on the lookout for dangers that may be encountered at the risk of being charged
with contributory negligence. Nor is mere speed at which the taxicab is driving a matter with which the passenger need ordinarily concern himself. But, if the automobile be driven at a speed dangerous
under all circumstances, or the peculiar circumstances, and the passenger had an opportunity to warn or caution the driver, he cannot
recover. However, this is not to say that the passenger is to protest
against every act of the driver that he deems incautious or imprudent." It is evident that it is very difficult to say at what point the
passenger is negligent. The above passages from the opinion do indicate, however, that the passenger's duty to caution arises only in
extreme cases.

As explained by the court, the plaintiff should be barred from
recovery only where the dangers are patent and recognized by the
passenger. That is quite different from the type of case which would
be embraced in the instruction of the trial court, "if you find that the
plaintiff noticed or should have noticed such recklessness," which the
Supreme Court affirmed. The instructions quoted seem to vary from
the test of the Supreme Court, so that the plaintiff may be barred in
situations where that test would allow recovery.
The rule of the Supreme Court puts the question of the plaintiff's
negligence in issue only where the dangers are patent and a great
probability of injury obvious to the passenger; and under such circumstances it can scarcely be regarded as a hardship to oblige any individual to take steps to avoid injury. It would also be in accord with
the expressions of jurists in the other three situations where they
leave the vehicle in case such a course is practical and necessary to avoid
injury. Again he may not sit by and permit the driver of the vehicle to
encounter or enter into open dangers without protest and take the chances,
and if injured seek to recover damages from the driver or from one whose
negligence concurred with that of the driver's."
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limit the duty to caution to the case where the passenger recognizes
the extreme peril into which he is being driven.14
In conclusion, if the question should again arise, it is clear that
the question of the plaintiff's negligence for failure to caution the
operator of a common carrier should be put to the jury only where
the facts clearly show a full appreciation of the dangers by the plaintiff, and his subsequent failure to take steps to avoid injury. It seems
clear that the duty of cautioning can arise only in an extreme case
and then only if the plaintiff has an opportunity to warn after becoming aware of the impending dangers.

C.L.S.
"The rule as stated in Hardie v. Barrett, supra, note 5, is limited to
the case where the dangers are manifest to the passenger and he makes no
protest.
Likewise in State v. Phillinger, supra, note 6, p. 373, I2O Atl. 88i, the rule
stated is, "It would be unreasonable, we think, to hold that a passenger in an
automobile who knew that it was being driven at an excessive speed, etc., was
not guilty of contributory negligence."
In Knoxville Ry. v. Vangilder, supra, note 5, P. 498, 178 S. W. 1120, the
rule is stated, "'Ordinarily, however, a driver is intrusted with caring for the
safety of the carriage and its occupants and unless the danger is obvious, or
is known to the passenger, he may rely upon the assumption that the driver
will exercise proper care and caution."
Since that is the extent of the duty of a guest, clearly the duty of a paying
passenger is no greater, and, in view of the relationship between him and the
carrier, his duty should not arise except in cases of extreme danger.

